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Abstract  
A histogram cosine similarity matching method for real-time transport protocol (RTP) timestamp 
difference vectors and a clustering method of the area between the best-fit curves of 2 RTP timestamp 
difference sequences is presented. These 2 methods realize timestamp-based least significant bit (LSB) 
steganography detection respectively. A clustering analysis of the area between the 5th-degree 
polynomial best-fit curves with message windows w of 20, 50, 100, and 200 was conducted. The results 
indicated that when the message window w was 100, the result was the best when the characteristic 
extraction time was shortest, and the initial clustering accuracy was 84.5%. Through further analysis, 
the clustering accuracy was increased to 100% in the 2nd round of clustering based on whether the mean 
distance from a data point in an initial cluster to each cluster center was changed. 
 
Keywords: RTP, timestamp, model-fitting, area difference, cluster, covert channel 
 
 1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Covert channels comprise some of the main content of research in the field of information hiding. With 
the rapid development of network technology and the widespread popularization of the internet, the 
formation of network covert channels is evitable[1,2]. There is a great deal of streaming media data in 
the network that needs real-time transmission; the real-time transfer protocol/RTP control protocol 
(RTP/RTCP) provides important services for this purpose and has become one of the main objects and 
carriers used in network covert channels. Because each RTP data packet consists of 2 parts, the protocol 
head and the effective data (payload), the redundant segment or the valid data of in a network protocol 
can be used as a load to construct a network covert channel. 
Because a network covert channel embeds hidden information in the redundant segment of the 
network protocol, it is strongly concealed and difficult for security equipment and detection equipment 
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to identify[3]. Even when the covert channel is uncovered, the hidden information is not recovered in 
transmission due to the special mechanism used in the construction. Second, studies have shown that 
even if a data packet carries 1 bit of data, the network covert channel can illegally transmit 26 GB of 
information from a large website within a year; its practical value is extremely high. Evidently, the 
RTP/RTCP is widely used in network steganography constructs as one of the main streaming media 
transmission protocols. The means to use the redundancy of the RTP/RTCP for information hiding and 
detection has become a trend of development and a focus of research. 
The structural organization of the thesis is as follows. The next part of the study analyzes the status 
of related research in constructing storage network covert channels and the detection method. Part 3 
presents a detection method based on similarity matching of the histogram of the difference vector 
between RTP timestamps. Part 4 presents a clustering analysis-based method of detecting the area 
between best-fit curves for RTP timestamp difference sequences. Part 5 is an analysis of the 
experiments and results. Part 6 is the summary. 
 
 2.  RELATED RESEARCH 
Network covert channels are usually classified as storage covert channels and time convert channels. 
The network jitter and transmission delay mainly have greater impacts on time convert channels due to 
the instability of internet transmission. In this study, only the construction of a storage covert channel 
and the corresponding detection method is discussed. 
At present, storage covert channels are mainly constructed based on the storage segment of 
transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) packets. The method for detecting concealment 
primarily focuses on the use of the reserved segment of protocol header, the fill segment, and the covert 
channel constructed from the unused segment. These segments are often fixed at certain values; only a 
change in the protocol segment's value needs to be examined to determine whether a covert channel is 
present; the detection is quite simple. In addition, using IP identification (IPID), changes in information 
such as the IP lifetime and the TCP initial sequence number have followable patterns; this type of covert 
channel can be detected through statistical analysis, which performs mode matching with normal data 
packets [4,5]. Reference [6] used cluster analysis to detect a storage covert channel in a network using 
the identifier segment and the header checksum segment in IP headers as carriers. Liu et al. [7] 
extracted a feature of a recursive graph for network storage data sequencing, which effectively 
completed the detection of a network storage covert channel. While the detection accuracy is high, the 
detection process is more cumbersome. Reference [8,9] simulated the method  of  detecting  a 
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network storage covert channel with optimization based on the improved correction entropy but found 
that this resulted in an increased computational intensity. References [10] and [11] used Markov models 
to perform detection by analyzing the transition between TCP states for TCP-based covert channels. 
Although the current commonly used steganography method, which is based on the insensitivity of 
TCP-based timestamps to the least significant bit (LSB), can increase the timestamp, a slight time delay 
in TCP data packet transmission can make the timestamp consistent with the actual time. Second, 
because many factors can cause the timestamp to change, the network monitoring and detection 
technique cannot determine all the reasons for a change in the TCP timestamp; therefore, using 
timestamps can make it easier to hide information [12]. There are very few reported methods for 
effectively detecting covert channels constructed using this type of method. Additionally, the 
RTP/RTCP is based on the user datagram protocol (UDP) or the TCP [13,14] to ensure real-time data 
transmission and protocol control, as shown in (Fig. 1). There are even fewer results for hiding and 
detecting information in timestamps in the RTP/RTCP. Therefore, this paper presents a detection 
method based on difference histogram similarity matching using RTP timestamps and LSB 
steganography and a method of detecting based on clustering using the area difference between 2 
best-fit curves. 
  
 3.  DIFFERENCE HISTOGRAM SIMILARITY MATCHING 
 3.1 Difference Histogram of the Timestamps in an RTP Packet Flow 
The timestamp field of an RTP packet for the streaming media transmission protocol occupies 32 bits, 
which is the first sampled byte of RTP packet data. It is mainly used to reconstruct the sequence of 
received data packets on the receiving end. The initial timestamp is random, and the subsequent 
timestamps increase progressively. For instance, with voice packets, the timestamp increase is equal to 
the packet interval times the sampling rate; if the packet interval is 30 ms and the sampling rate is 8000 
Hz, the timestamp of each successive packet increases by 240. Evidently, the RTP packet timestamp 
increases monotonically. Fig. 2 shows the original timestamps of 10001 RTP packets extracted in this 
study; the results show linear growth. However, the information hidden in the timestamps is bound to 
change their original distribution; this paper uses difference histograms to express the change in an RTP 
packet's timestamp before and after steganography. Fig. 3 (a) and (b) are the difference histograms of an 
RTP packet's timestamp for the least significant bit before and after steganography. It is evident that the 
difference is large, which means one can use the histogram similarity matching method to detect the 
RTP packet's timestamp in LSB steganography. 
 
 
 
Y.W.X, T. S.Y and W.G.P: RTP timestamp steganography detection method                                                               4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Original RTP packet flow timestamps 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Structure of the RTP/RTCP 
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 3.2 Difference Histogram Similarity	 	
In the analysis of an RTP packet data stream, the timestamp of each RTP packet in data stream is called 
τi (1 ≤ i ≤ N), and the adjacent timestamp is differentiated to obtain the difference sequence D = d1, d2, 
…, dN-1, where 
            .               (1) 
Then, D is segmented based on a certain size, and the data in each segment Di are detected. The 
frequency of the timestamp difference is used as the vertical coordinate of histogram, and the difference 
sequence serves as the horizontal coordinate to calculate the histogram, which forms a vector u∈R10 of 
detected objects from the histogram. Cosine similarity is used to calculate the cosine of 2 vectors in 
measuring the difference between the 2 sub-sequences. The closer the cosine is to 1, the closer to 0 
degrees the angle is, which indicates that the 2 vectors are similar. Compared to distance measurement, 
cosine similarity focuses more on the difference of 2 vectors in terms of their direction, but not their 
distance or length. The directionality in the difference timestamp sequence changes over time. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3. Difference histograms for RTP packet flow 
timestamps before and after steganography 
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Therefore, this study uses cosine similarity to measure the similarity of 2 timestamp sequences to 
determine whether steganography is present in the timestamps. The formula is as follows: 
                                 (2) 
where di and dj are the vectors of the 2 sequences and n is the length of a sequence. The specific 
calculation steps are as follows: 
(1) Calculate the timestamp difference sequence for 2 adjacent RTP packets, D = d1, d2, …, dN-1. 
(2) Divide D into 250 sequences of length 40 and detect the data in each sequence Di. The frequency 
of the timestamp difference is taken as the vertical coordinate of the histogram, and the 
difference sequence is the horizontal coordinate in calculating the histogram of its distribution, 
which forms a vector u∈R10 of the detected object from the histogram.  
(3) Calculate the cosine similarity S of the 2 vectors. When the similarity is , the 2 vectors 
are of the same type, and vice versa. 
 
 
 4. MODEL FITTING AND CLUSTERING ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION 
 4.1 Modeling with polynomial fitting 
The RTP timestamp increases monotonically by a fixed increment; therefore, its difference sequence is 
constant. Additionally, the steganography changes the original distribution of the timestamps, which 
means that the difference sequence is no longer constant. This difference can be clearly expressed by 
means of model fitting, as shown in Fig. 4. The x-axis is the number of a channel message in the 
sequence, and the y-axis is the difference in its timestamp. 
Assuming the timestamp difference sequence of a w+1 message window in a certain communication 
process is (d1, d2, ..., dw) (w>=1), a set of points to be fitted, P={i, di) | i=1, 2, ..., w; w≥1}can be 
obtained; P is the set of time differences in the sequence for the message's serial number and 
transmission. A polynomial model of the inter-channel RTP timestamp difference can be obtained by 
polynomial fitting. The polynomial fitting model (shown in Fig. 4) illustrates the effect and variation of 
the timestamp due to the steganography nicely. Additionally, the results serve as the clustering subject, 
which determines whether the steganography is present by means of a clustering algorithm. 
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Polynomial fitting optimization 
Optimizing the curve fitting process, that is, finding an optimal function that matches the set of data, is 
critical. One of the most commonly used approaches is the least squares method[15]. The measured 
timestamp difference sequence data are labeled , where w is the of data points in the 
window. The fitting function is represented by a polynomial ; then, 
          
       (3) 
where  and is the estimated value of . In this case, the square of the distance 
between the observation point and the estimated point is . The core idea of the least squares 
method is to minimize the weighted sum of the squares of the residual error (or deviation) Ek between 
each point of model and the actual observed values. That is, the value of 
 is minimized to obtain the parameter's value [15]. The partial 
derivative of Ek with respect to aj is taken, as shown in equation (4), to obtain a linear equation of 
degree k+1. 
                         (4)                      
The k+1 undetermined coefficients aj (j=0, 1, 2, …, k) can be obtained by solving the set of equations.  
 
Selection of the polynomial's order 
 
Figure 4 . The best-fit curves of the RTP timestamp difference 
sequences for normal and steganographic channels 
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Selecting the order is of the utmost importance in polynomial fitting. Usually, the higher the order is, 
the more accurate the fit is and the smaller the residual error is. However, as the order increases, 
over-fitting may occur, and the algorithm's complexity increases, which may even lead to a reduction in 
the number of clusters due to high dimensionality. Therefore, a higher order may not lead to a better 
result. Only the appropriate order of the polynomial can accurately reflect the  variation  tendency  
of  the timestamps and correctly determine the presence of hidden information through clustering in 
real time. As shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b), the accuracy of the 3rd-order polynomial fitting is too low, and 
the accuracy is higher at the 7th order than at the 5th, but this takes too long. Fitting to a 5th-order 
polynomial not only clearly reflects the difference in the timestamps before and after steganography but 
also takes the least time. After the time and accuracy of best-fit polynomials of different orders were 
compared experimentally, the 5th order was selected for this experiment.  
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.  Best-fit curves and fitting times for different orders 
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 4.2 Selection and Extraction of Cluster Characteristics 
 
Polynomial coefficients of the best-fit curve 
The result of polynomial fitting depends on the coefficients. Table 1 provides the coefficients that were 
constructed using 2 sets of channels: a normal one, c(x), and a steganographic one, h(x). It is evident 
that the coefficients of the best-fit polynomial for the normal channel are different from those for the 
steganographic channel. However, the coefficients of the normal channel and the highest-order 
coefficient of the two channels are small and 5 orders of magnitude smaller than the coefficients of the 
lowest order. The value of a polynomial depends mainly on the highest term, and the weight of each 
coefficient is different; therefore, direct use of polynomial modelling for clustering is not appropriate. 
 
Calculation of the area between the best-fit curves 
It was shown above that polynomial fitting cannot be directly used for clustering. However, by 
analyzing and comparing the best-fit curves (Fig. 4) of the normal and steganographic channels, it was 
found that the area enclosed by c(x), h(x), x=1 and x=w had a larger difference; this difference can be 
used to distinguish between normal and steganographic channels. To better reflect this difference, the 
following formula is used to calculate the area under the absolute value of the difference between two 
curves; this integral is used as the clustering subject. 
       .                  (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.3 Clustering algorithm implementation 
The core of clustering is to select a method for measuring the similarity or distance and to construct an 
objective function[16,17,18]. K-means clustering is a clustering algorithm that uses the square of the 
error, a criterion function, and the most commonly used Euclidean distance to measure similarity. This 
Table 1: c(x) and h(x) fitting coefficients 
Order 
number  
model 
 
5 
 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
c(x) -4.37e-18 2.166e-
16 
-4.06e-
15 
3.62e-1
4 
-1.50e-
13 
240 
h(x) -4.41e-05 0.002 -0.04 0.37 -1.36 241 
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algorithm is simple, effective, and flexible enough for processing large data sets. Therefore, this study 
used the results of k-means clustering as basic information to calculate the average distance to the 
center; then, a determination was made based on the change in the average, and a more accurate 
clustering result was obtained. It was found from experiments that the average distance from a 
data point to the center remained constant after clustering in a normal channel but varied in a 
steganographic channel. As shown in Fig. 6, a covert channel can be accurately identified accordingly. 
The specific steps are as follows: 
(1) First, calculate the area between the best-fit curves {Sd} for the timestamp difference sequences 
between normal channels and between normal and steganography channels for window length w. 
(2) Select initial values from the clustering subject {Sd} multiple times, and search for the k most 
appropriate centers for each initial value {C1, C2, …, Ck}. 
(3) Calculate the residual distance between each data point and each center R(i, k) using the 
following equation; cluster data points that are closest to the center point into the group represented by 
that center: 
 
    (6) 
(4) Use Equation (7) to calculate the center of each group,  
                      (7) 
where Nk represents the number of data points in group Ck and Sdi represents all data points in Ck.
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(5) Repeat steps (3) and (4) until the error squared and the criterion function start to converge; that is, 
the value of the cluster's center no longer changes. By so doing, the cluster centers  of each group of 
data and the distance from each point to the center of each cluster Rk can be obtained. 
(6) Calculate the average distance Rk between each data point and each cluster center  using 
Equation (8), 
                        (8) 
where i=1, 2, …, n and Nk is the number of centers in group . 
(7) Compare the value of M for each data point to the value of M for a normal data point; if they are 
the same, then the channel is normal; otherwise, the channel is covert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Variation of the average distance between each point and 
each cluster center when the window w is 50 and 100 
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 5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 5.1Experimental process 
The data collection platform used in this experiment includes a switch used in a local area network 
(LAN), a normal user, and a pair of covert communicators. All the local network traffic goes through 
the switch; by configuring a switch mirror port, all data packets entering and leaving the mirror port are 
copied and sent to a monitoring port. The experimental data are obtained from the monitoring port using 
the WinPcap data collection structure in a Windows environment. First, the network card is put into 
promiscuous mode to receive all the data packets on the network. The main task is to filter, statistically 
analyze, and cache the RTP packets in the netgroup packet filter (NPF) through the definition of rue 
base. The specific steps are as follows: 
(1) Normal data: 10001 normal channel timestamp segments of RTP data packets are collected using 
the above described experiment platform. 
(2) Hidden data: by random bit replacement of the LSB of the RTP timestamp header field on both 
sides of the hidden communication using the collection platform, 10001 hidden data packets are 
obtained. 
(3) The difference histogram of the RTP timestamps of normal and steganography data packets are 
calculated using the method and steps in section 3.2; from this, a vector for the monitoring subject, 
u∈R10, is generated. Then, the cosine of the 2 vectors is calculated, and cosine similarity is applied. If 
the similarity to a normal data packet is less than 0.95, then the packet is steganographic. The 
experimental results are shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 (4) The results are fitted to a 5th-order 
polynomial, and the RTP timestamp sequence is 
optimized using the method in section 4.1; the area 
between the 2 best-fit curves is selected as the 
clustering subject. 
(5) Use the steps in section 4.3 to perform 
clustering. In the experiment, the value of the 
curve-fitted message window w has a significant 
influence on the modeling and clustering results; this 
study includes experiments for w values of 20, 50, 
100, 150 and 200. The focus of the comparison is on the time required to extract the characteristics of 
each cluster, the rate of change of the average distance between a data point and each cluster center, 
 
Figure 7.  Cosine similarity 
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the accuracy of the initial and final clustering results, and the rate of false positives in the initial 
clustering results for different values of w. The results are shown in Table 2. In addition, the curves of 
initial and final clustering results are performed to compare the detection results of in Table 2. As 
shown in Fig. 8. And the training time 13.2s of the algorithm in this paper is compared with the 
training time 14.7s of the algorithm in [6]. The detection algorithm in this paper has the advantage of 
in training time. 
 
 5.2 Analysis of results 
It can be seen from Fig. 7 that the cosine similarity of the RTP timestamp difference histogram vector is 
1, whereas the cosine similarity between the RTP timestamp difference histogram vector for the normal 
and steganography channels is 0; therefore, the proposed method is excellent at detecting steganography 
channel timestamps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the proposed 
method for clustering RTP timestamp difference 
sequences based on the area between 2 best-fit 
curves can used for detecting steganography 
channels using timestamps. When the message 
window w is 100, the characteristic extraction time 
is quite short, the probability of a change in the 
average distance between each data point and each 
cluster center is the lowest, the accuracy of the 
initial clustering is the highest, the false positive rate 
Table 2: Characteristic extraction time and clustering 
results 
w 
parameter 
20 50 100 200 
time T/s 878.5 313.4 153.8 62.3 
Mean change % 91.6 87.5 65.6 90 
initial accuracy % 68.9 74.3 84.5 82 
final accuracy % 100 100 100 100 
initial false positives % 50.7 34 23.7 26.5 
 
 
Figure 8. comparison curve of initial and final clustering results 
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is the lowest, and the clustering result is the best. With different values of w, the results of the 2nd round 
of clustering in this study are all 100% accurate. Moreover, the experimental verification showed that 
the window w cannot be too small; using a value of w that is too small can lead to an increase in the 
number of clustering subjects, which reduces the clustering accuracy. At the same time, w cannot be too 
large; using a value of w that is too large increases the difficulty of modeling. Therefore, the suitable 
range for w is 50-200. 
 
 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented a histogram-based cosine similarity matching method for RTP timestamp 
difference vectors and a clustering method based on the area between the best-fit curves for 2 RTP 
timestamp difference sequences;  
timestamp-based LSB steganography detection was realized. The first method is simple, reliable, and 
very accurate, whereas the 2nd method produces very good initial clustering results when the window w 
is 100; it reached an accuracy of 84.5%. Based on the initial clustering results, a 2nd round of clustering 
was performed based on whether the average distance between each pair of clusters had changed. The 
results of the 2nd round of clustering were excellent for the different windows, and 100% accuracy was 
reached. 
Innovation1: Proposed a method for applying clustering to RTP timestamp difference sequences based 
on the area between 2 best-fit curves; simply and effectively realized RTP timestamp-based LSB 
steganography detection. 
Innovation 2: Based on the average distance between the center of the initial cluster and those of each of 
the other clusters, a 2nd round of clustering was performed; this increased the accuracy to 100%. 
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